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ABSTRACT
In consequential real-world applications, machine learning
(ML) based systems are expected to provide fair and non-
discriminatory decisions on candidates from groups defined
by protected attributes such as gender and race. These ex-
pectations are set via policies or regulations governing data
usage and decision criteria (sometimes explicitly calling out
decisions by automated systems). Often, the data creator,
the feature engineer, the author of the algorithm and the
user of the results are different entities, making the task of
ensuring fairness in an end-to-end ML pipeline challenging.
Manually understanding the policies and ensuring fairness
in opaque ML systems is time-consuming and error-prone,
thus necessitating an end-to-end system that can: 1) under-
stand policies written in natural language, 2) alert users to
policy violations during data usage, and 3) log each activity
performed using the data in an immutable storage so that
policy compliance or violation can be proven later. We pro-
pose such a system to ensure that data owners and users are
always in compliance with fairness policies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Today we see machine learning (ML) being applied in vari-
ous domains and affecting people across all walks of life [18].
Application of ML algorithms in domains such as criminal
justice, credit scoring, and hiring is promising, but at the
same time, concerns of algorithmic fairness to individuals
with certain protected traits are being raised [13]. Due to
such considerations, there is a growing demand for fairness,
accountability and transparency from ML systems [7]. ML
systems rely heavily on training data and hence are prone
to learn various biases present in the data. For example,
multiple issues could arise if one builds a system to predict
hiring decisions using attributes such as academic qualifica-
tion, work experience, location, and gender. The system de-
signer/developer may use some sensitive attributes to train
the model, which is against policy (gender and location are
sensitive attributes in this example) and the algorithm may
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learn various biases present in the data e.g. if the training
data has a gender bias, the model may also learn this pat-
tern. If such a model is deployed in the hiring process, then
it may be unfair and the associated parties could be liable
for prosecution.
Let us consider the well-known example of the COMPAS
recidivism dataset, which contains the criminal history and
personal information of offenders in the criminal justice sys-
tem [13]. This type of data is used by the COMPAS risk
assessment tool1 for estimating the criminal recidivism (re-
offending) risk of individuals. Recently, an offender named
Loomis challenged the use of COMPAS risk assessment sys-
tem for sentencing, claiming that it took away the defen-
dant’s right to due process and suspecting it of using gender
to predict the risk.
The final decision in the Loomis lawsuit2 can act as a policy
document for appropriate use of algorithmic decision making
in criminal sentencing. One important line in the ruling is
as follows:
“6 The court of appeals certified the specific ques-
tion of whether the use of a COMPAS risk assess-
ment at sentencing “violates a defendant’s right
to due process, either because the proprietary na-
ture of COMPAS prevents defendants from chal-
lenging the COMPAS assessment’s scientific va-
lidity, or because COMPAS assessments take gen-
der into account.”
The system we envision will automatically perform knowl-
edge extraction and reasoning on such a document to iden-
tify the sensitive fields (gender in this case), and support
testing for and prevention of biased algorithmic decision
making against groups defined by those fields.
Checking for policy violations is a non-trivial task since it
requires a machine to first understand policies written in
natural language and then assess if they are being violated
1http://doc.wi.gov/about/doc-overview/
office-of-the-secretary/office-of-reentry/
compas-assessment-tool
2https://www.leagle.com/decision/inwico20160713i48
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at any point in the processing pipeline, whether in data col-
lection, feature transformation, algorithm development, or
results interpretation. Although it is expected that the ML
system will adhere to the policy guidelines, we also need it
to be auditable in case of any violations that occur. Hence
we need a system which will do the following:
• interpret policies written in natural language from pol-
icy documents,
• monitor data access and generate alerts if any access
related violations occur either in the development or
production setup of the ML system,
• log each activity performed by the ML system in an
immutable storage so that it can be audited, and
• test the ML system for fairness policies.
Recent work has focused on developing learning algorithms
which are fair [19, 11] and developing methods to assess
whether an ML system is biased [1, 20, 3]. However, an
overall system architecture that ensures adherence to the
policies associated with the data is missing. In this paper
we propose a system (framework) to realize the above ob-
jectives.
2. RELATEDWORK
There is increasing interest and a growing body of literature
on the topics of fairness, accountability and transparency
in machine learning systems. Researchers are interested in
developing methods to ensure fairness assuming the dataset
is biased, and also in designing methods to audit any black-
box predictive model for its adherence to fairness policies.
A new notion of unfairness, disparate mistreatment defined
in terms of misclassification rates was introduced in [19].
A fair classifier is formulated by encoding this measure as
additional constraints on the learning problem. In [11], the
authors propose a method to certify disparate impact based
on the predictability of the protected attributes from non-
protected attributes. They also describe methods by which
this bias can be removed from the data.
Adebayo and Kagal propose a method based on orthogo-
nal projection of features to diagnose bias in a black box
predictive model [1]. A measure that indicates whether a
black-box classifier is biased against a group of samples is
presented in [5]. In [3], the authors study the indirect in-
fluence that some features have on outcomes, through other
related features in black box models. When the model is di-
rectly examined, the features that are indirectly influencing
outcomes may not be used by the model at all. The degree
to which the input features influence the outputs of the sys-
tem are quantified in [10], to to explain the decisions made
by the system. The predictive bias of a classifier is identified
using a subset scan method in [20].
The techniques proposed in above works are independent
approaches that either ensure fairness or audit the model
for fairness. In contrast, our goal is to have an end-to-end
Figure 1: High-level system architecture.
system which can flag any fairness policy violations and pro-
vide support for auditing. Such a system is useful to large
organizations in ensuring that their developers follow the
policies associated with the data. In such a system, the
methods we reviewed in the previous paragraphs, especially
the ones built for auditing purposes, could be used as mod-
ules to check for fairness. We note that, to the best of our
knowledge, a system we desire is not available. In the next
sections we describe the proposed system architecture in de-
tail.
3. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The high level architecture of the proposed system is shown
in Figure 1. The inputs to the system are:
1. ML algorithm or ML based system,
2. natural language policy document(s) associated with
the domain or dataset used by the ML based system,
and
3. 〈optional〉 ontology or schema associated with the dataset.
Given these inputs, the goals of the proposed system are:
• understand the natural language policies and store them
in machine readable format,
• identify the set of policies that lie in the scope of our
system (fairness and data usage policies will mainly be
chosen),
• identify policy violations in run time by both passively
and actively probing the running system, and
• log all activities in an immutable storage like Blockchain
so that policy violations or compliance can be proved
by any party (data owners, policymakers, data users).
3.1 Interpreting Natural Language Policies
Policy documents can be large domain-specific lists of sen-
tences. The output of this step is a structured, machine-
readable set of policies in XML or JSON format. If the
schema associated with the data is given, the policies can
Figure 2: Entity resolution and mapping with the
fields in a dataset.
be easily associated with the entities in the schema. The
entities identified from the policy documents can be mapped
to the entities in the schema. Figure 2 shows how this can
be achieved when the schema of the data is known. In the
example of the figure, the policy concerning gender is from
Loomis and the policy concerning ethnicity is just a moti-
vating example.
While structured data sources often have well-defined schemata,
ML systems relying on plain text corpora tend to extract
entities from the corpus as per their own semantics. These
entities can be as simple as words, word counts, punctuation
mark, etc., or as complex as person or organization having
many simple or complex attributes. In ML systems using
extractors like SystemT [9] where extractors explicitly de-
fine the ontology for the extracted and consumed entities,
mapping the policies to the entities is still a feasible task.
The remaining case where the dataset is unstructured plain
text and the ML algorithm is a black box with no machine
readable specifications defining input entities or features is
the toughest to handle. In such cases, there is still some
hope if we have access to the documentation of the system.
Here, we must map policies to upper ontologies like SUMO
[16] or Wordnet [14] as shown in Figure 3. Afterwards, the
extracted concepts (rather than the full policy documents)
are manually inspected.
3.2 Representing Policies
The policies interpreted in the preceding step must be rep-
resented in a structured machine-readable format such as
XML or JSON with defined schema. We find XACML (eX-
tensible Access Control Markup Language) [6] to be a strong
and flexible representation that is the most suitable stan-
dard; we can extend the specifications to accommodate fairness-
related directives in addition to access control. For our
running example, Figure 4 shows how these policies can be
stored in a machine readable format. We only display simple
XMLs in the figure for convenience, but this is extensible to
more complex schemata involving time-frames and locations
associated with the policies.
3.3 Run Time Policy Check
Policy checking during run time is the primary task of our
system. The work flow of this module varies greatly based
on the type of the input and the transparency of the system.
Simple policies like access-control are easier to check. For
Figure 3: Alerting the user with the list of enti-
ties associated with the policies when no information
about the system is available.
example, a policy stating ‘ML systems should not use gender
information from the dataset for decision making’ is much
easier to detect than a policy stating ‘Systems using this
dataset should not be biased in decision making with respect
to gender and race’. In the later case, depending on the
structure of the data source and the transparency of the
system, multiple cases need to be considered.
In general, the term transparent ML algorithms is used for
the ML algorithms whose behavior can be explained/inter-
preted by looking at the learned model [17]. Our expectation
of transparency are only limited to input specification, which
is sufficient for the context of policy check. Hence, we will
use the term transparent-input algorithms. The internals of
the algorithm may be opaque (how the algorithm uses the
input data, how much importance is given to a particular
field, etc.).
Case 1: Structured data and transparent-input al-
gorithm
Here, the data is structured, i.e., organized with a well-
defined schema. Additionally, the ML system defines the
list of inputs that are consumed. The mapping between the
fields of the data and the inputs of the system may or may
not be available, but because of their structured nature,
identifying the mapping automatically is very easy either
by direct string matching or by identifying synonymous
and semantically-related field names [15]. Once we have
this mapping, we exactly know which input fields are being
used by the system. With this information, we can quickly
identify the policies associated with these fields.
Case 2: Structured data and opaque algorithm
Here, we do not have information about the subset of the
fields that are being used by the ML algorithm. In such
cases, the user of our system may specify the fields that
are used by the algorithm, and the flow becomes similar
to case 1. If not, we can safely assume that the system is
using all the fields from the data and proceed accordingly.
Figure 4: XML representation of the extracted policies
Case 3: Unstructured data and transparent-input
algorithm
This is the typical case mostly represented by the ML sys-
tems associated with their own feature extraction logic.
The unstructured data can be in any format like plain text,
image, audio stream, etc. Since we have the input speci-
fication of the ML system, we will have to map the poli-
cies directly to the input specifications of the ML systems.
Since the policies are written by the data owner, and the
ML system is designed by a different person, the fields re-
ferred in the policies and those in the input specifications
may not have too many exact string matches. Hence, we
need to map the fields from policies and the input specifi-
cations to a common ontology, and create a mapping. In
some cases, the names could be from different languages.
Here, we will have to use cross-lingual linked concept hier-
archies such as linked wordnets of multiple languages [8].
One good example for this case is an ML system consum-
ing features extracted from plain text using extractors like
SystemT [9]. Here, the extractor explicitly defines the on-
tology of the entities and relationships that are extracted
from the input text.
Case 4: Unstructured data and opaque algorithm
This is the toughest case to handle automatically. Here,
our system will expect some manual work from the user.
The user of our system could be either the developer of
the ML algorithm or the end-user of the ML algorithm. In
both cases, the person who handles the data is responsible
for ensuring that the policies are not violated. If the devel-
oper is creating the trained model, he or she is aware of the
information being extracting from the unstructured data,
and specify it accordingly in our system. If the developer
is just shipping the algorithm to the end user without any
trained model, and the end-user wants to train the algo-
rithm on data with associated policies, the end-user must
read the documentation or release notes written by the de-
velopers to understand the usage of the data by the algo-
rithm. Based on this information, the end-user can specify
the list of fields against which the policies can be checked.
In all the above cases, we ultimately identify the list of fields
from the data that are consumed or extracted by the ML
system and map them to the policies. Once this is done,
the main task is to check the underlying ML system for fair-
ness. There are existing frameworks like FairML [2], which
can detect bias in the model for the known sensitive fea-
tures. FairML does this by analyzing the deviation in the
output when the sensitive features are perturbed. It also
takes the correlation among the features into account while
tweaking the input data. Here, FairML directly works with
the actual underlying trained model, and curated input fea-
ture vectors. We are targeting a more general case, where
we could have a black box system where inputs may not
be encoded into vector format externally, and the internal
vector representation of the features used by the algorithm
may not be known. The tweakable features could be in any
format like string, Boolean, number or complex type as per
the system specification and the available dataset. Our sys-
tem will work on one higher level of abstraction compared
to FairML. Though, the principle will be similar to that of
FairML in a way that we will change the sensitive feature to
see the deviation in the output.
3.4 Immutable Auditing
In addition to policy interpretations and run time checks, the
owners of the dataset may want to ensure that the dataset
is not used for biased decision making. The users of such
data sources can choose to train their algorithm using the
dataset via our pipeline. Our system will log the information
about the fields of the dataset that were accessed at the given
time along with the report about the fairness with respect
to the sensitive features extracted from the policies. Figure
5 shows how the immutable logging helps in auditing the
policy compliance by the users. The immutable logs can be
used to show that a particular instance of the trained model
was fair with respect to the sensitive features mentioned in
the policies. The other way in which these immutable logs
can be used is the data owner tracking the usage and the
compliance of the policies by different users.
Figure 5: Immutable logging
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
As a first milestone, we have established a generic archi-
tecture for an end-to-end fairness pipeline for ML. The sys-
tem will ensure quick fairness policy interpretations, reliable
compliance checks and notifications of violations. This lays a
foundation for an industry-wide standardization where data
owners can use our system to specify policies directly into
machine-readable format. This will make it easier for any
party to be as clear as possible with respect to compliance.
Our fairness pipeline will act as a trusted authority between
policymakers and users. The key goals that can be achieved
by this architecture are twofold. Firstly, it will save lot of
time on the user’s side in terms of manual policy interpre-
tation and assessment of their system. Secondly, the im-
mutable publicly accessible logs can be used to prove policy
compliance by the user.
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